

December 16, 1976

Executive Registry

76-5859/A

Dear Ms. Holland,

Thank you very much for your letter of December 7th. Unfortunately, I will not be able to accept your invitation to speak at SCOMA 22. That is a very complicated time in our lives, the time frame in which I expect to be coming back to Texas.

I do appreciate your thoughtful invitation and I appreciate your kind words about my appearance last April in Annapolis. I would love to come back to A&M one of these days, but unfortunately I'm afraid I can't accept for this year. Many thanks for inviting me.

Yours very truly,

/s/ George Bush

George Bush

Ms. Darla S. Holland
Office of M.S.C. Council and Directorate
Texas A&M University
Box 5718
College Station, Texas 77844

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STATINTL

memorial student center
texas A&M university

BOX 5718 • COLLEGE STATION, TEXAS 77844 • OFFICE OF M. S. C. COUNCIL AND DIRECTORATE

TWENTY-SECOND STUDENT CONFERENCE ON NATIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE

Executive Registry

76-5859

December 7, 1976

*Desk
request*

Mr. George Bush, Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Bush:

The Executive Committee of the Twenty-Second Student Conference on National Affairs (SCONA 22) invites you to address a group of student leaders representing universities throughout the United States, Canada, and Mexico.

SCONA is an annual program presented by students of Texas A&M University with the objective of developing responsible leadership through intellectual interaction. It is very similar in nature to the Naval Academy Foreign Affairs Conference at which you spoke last April in Annapolis, Maryland. As a delegate to that Conference, I was very impressed with your speech content and delivery, and I feel that your presence at SCONA would add another dimension to our Conference.

SCONA 22, which will take place February 16-19, 1977, is entitled THE EXPRESSION OF INDIVIDUALITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY. This theme is intended to explore those opportunities and problems facing the individual in a rapidly changing society. The issues that will be examined include a study of man's ability to cope with personal conflicts in a technological world, an investigation of evolving relationships among those within that society, and an inquiry into the effects of the altered physical and social environment upon the individual. The issue which we would like you to address concerns governmental encroachments upon an individual's personal life.

Should you accept this invitation, our schedule is flexible enough at this time to place your presentation any time between February 16-19; however, the most advantageous time for your speech in relation to other planned activities would be the morning of February 17.

The accompanying information provides further indications of the nature of the proposed presentation and the scope of the Conference. Please call us at 713-845-1515 if you desire further information.

Mr. George Bush

December 7, 1976

We sincerely hope, Mr. Bush, that you will give serious consideration to participation in the SCONA program. Your audience would be a most receptive one, and your presentation would be extremely valuable to those in attendance.

Sincerely,

Darla S. Holland

Darla S. Holland
Planning Chairman
SCONA 22

/eas

Enclosures: Speaking Invitation
SCONA 21 Proceedings
SCONA 22 Pre-Conference Brochure

xc: Congressman Olin E. Teague, Washington, D. C., SCONA 22 Executive Advisor
Dr. John E. Pearson, Dean, College of Business Administration, SCONA 22
Chief Advisor

*Substitute
P.C. Affairs*

Executive Registry
76-4419/2A

December 16, 1976

Dear Jim,

Thank you for your thoughtful note and the enclosures. I just can't tell you how much I appreciate your kind words.

I am going away next week for awhile, but I will be back to finish this job out through January. After January 20th, but before the middle of February, I will be around Washington and have plenty of free time. I look forward to seeing you. Thanks for your letter.

Yours very truly,

George Bush

Mr. James Angleton
4814 33rd Road North
Arlington, Virginia 22207

DCI/GB/dlg

Orig - Adse


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For Mr. Angleton's Review



THE ALL AMERICAN
BICENTENNIAL
MINSTRELS

MEMO FROM
~~GEORGE~~ MURPHY

13 Dec. 1976

PERSONAL.

Dear George :

The enclosures are from
from the printers and will be in general
circulation this week.

I have written a similar
note to Hank Knoche and have called
his attention to the footnote on page 2.
More important, I have reason to believe
that a copy of "High Noon" will be in the
hands of Carter shortly. I have made use of
a trusted and proven channel - an individual
who enjoys unimpeded access.



THE ALL AMERICAN
BICENTENNIAL
MINSTRELS

MEMO FROM
GEORGE MURPHY

- 2 -

*I have informed Hank that I
wish to discuss with him some outstanding
business in the not too distant future
matter which might prove to be a waste
of your valuable time.*

*In any event, I wish you well
and when your liberation occurs, perhaps
you would be prepared to meet with me
(and a friend or two) to discuss the future.*

*Kindest personal regards
from*



American Cause

a bipartisan, tax-exempt, political education organization

The Honorable George Murphy, Director

Special
Report

December 1976

HIGH NOON



The vital choices in national security awaiting President-elect Carter bring to mind the dilemma of the citizens of Hadleyville when, as the clock ticked on, Marshal Kane appealed to them to stand with him against the menace arriving on the noon train. Will the man from Plains, Georgia rise to a like occasion?

by James Angleton and C.J. V. Murphy

Mr. Angleton, through the last 20 of his 31 years with the Central Intelligence Agency and the founding Office of Strategic Services (OSS), was Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA. Mr. Murphy was for 34 years a writer and editor of Fortune magazine.

scured as it was in the wandering Presidential debate on defense and foreign policy in Philadelphia in October. If the verbiage uttered by the candidates should ever be recalled, it will hardly be for their elucidation of the facts and implications of the world power balance and the American role therein. They were all but strangers, unencumbered by serious problems, addressing earthlings as

"In conditions of detente the front lines of ideological conflict do not become silent. On the contrary, they become deeper and wider."

Boris Ponomarev, Secretary of the Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, July 1975.

John Erickson, Director of Defense Studies at the University of Edinburgh, began an analysis¹ of the Kremlin's current strategy with this portentous item of communist exegesis. Comrade Ponomarev's purpose was to reassure the international parties, particularly the Eurocommunists, that beneath the cover of detente the class war was to be waged relentlessly. That brutal diktat is all the more ominous by reason of the political vacuum that has arrested serious American thinking on defense and strategy since President Nixon and Dr. Kissinger traveled in pomp to Moscow in the summer of 1972, there to set in motion the process of detente, semantic step-child of Lenin's strategy of "peaceful coexistence."

Seldom has a sense of national purpose been so ob-

scured as it was in the wandering Presidential debate on defense and foreign policy in Philadelphia in October. If the verbiage uttered by the candidates should ever be recalled, it will hardly be for their elucidation of the facts and implications of the world power balance and the American role therein. They were all but strangers, unencumbered by serious problems, addressing earthlings as

if by satellite from some celestial planet, yet to be identified in our planetary system.

In the aftermath, we are to have a new President. We wish him Godspeed. Unfortunately, we are left with the same vacuum. As Mr. Carter prepares for the Presidency, little more is known now about how he intends to engage American foreign and defense policies than was the case when he emerged in the New Hampshire primary. Indeed, he is all but beleaguered at the Plains' railroad station by the swarm of parochial constituencies which in their diversity of self-interest propelled him so narrowly into the White House.

The several minorities press him for thicker slices of the national product. The city political machines have already proclaimed that he is committed to sop up their overflowing debts. Others call for restoration of the forest primeval, which they seldom visit. And the radical left,

1. Professor Erickson's article was published in the Winter 1976 issue of the *Strategic Review*, an excellent American quarterly.

which has contributed nothing to the general economic well-being, wants efficient oil companies dismantled, and profitable transnational enterprises expurgated. (Strangely, not a whisper of complaint has been heard from the environmentalists, so fluent in denunciation when the polluter is American, about the radioactive fallout from the nuclear debris which mushrooms from the Chinese weapon tests and drifts across our land and into the food supply.) In all the hubbub, the constituencies concerned with national security and foreign policy—the proper interests of statesmen—can hardly be heard above the strident clamor for slashing defense spending and paring once honored alliances.

Four Questions Crying to be Asked

For the air of unreality surrounding the transfer of power, we citizens and the press are hardly less to blame than the politicians. In the absence of hard questions, the President was free to focus attention on how good our situation is at home, and how peaceful is the look of things abroad, thanks to the policy of accommodation with communist powers which he has stopped calling detente. Mr. Carter, for his part, sought to convince us how bad things really are at home, and though mainly through the voice of Vice President elect Mondale (Senator Church's tireless ally in detente and disarmament), how much safer the world is going to be once he has taken over the management of foreign policy from Dr. Kissinger. Neither candidate ever addressed himself directly to the Soviet military buildup and its relentless imperialism, most recently exemplified by the bloody takeover of Angola in conspiracy with Castro's tank-borne foreign legion.

Two of the candidates who went to the quick of things were Senator Henry M. Jackson and Governor Ronald Reagan. Senator Jackson was eliminated too early in the Democratic primaries for his theme to have impact on the debates. On the Republican side, Reagan was tardy in raising the issues to national consciousness and drew away from them before he had succeeded in taking the debate to the high ground where the national interest would have best been served.

In fairness, Mr. Carter should not be faulted for his immediate preoccupation with domestic matters. He has promises to keep. Promises to banish inflation, balance the Federal budget, promote full employment, spread the wealth, and launch a populist version of the millenium. Few can expect him to dwell on his rasher promises after he has reckoned their costs against what remains in the national till.

The American economy—that vast, booming engine which supports just about everything we do as a society—stands sorely in need of a fresh injection of confidence if the economic life-blood of risk capital is to continue to

flow to the marketplace. To the degree that we turn more productive and venturesome in our domestic activities, our influence will continue to be felt in the world, and will continue to redeem the profligacy of the politicians. But if Mr. Carter should try to shut our minds to what is really happening at the Moscow seat of communist power and strategic deception, then whatever improvements he may seem to foster in the material aspects of American life are certain to prove ephemeral.

For the present, one cannot judge where Mr. Carter really stands on the central issues relating to national security. In a rhetorical way, he is committed to trimming defense spending, easing our forces out of Europe and Asia, and thinning our remaining alliances and commitments while somehow returning the Nation to a stronger military posture. He also appears to have intimated to Party Leader Leonid Brezhnev, according to that ancient leaky and somewhat Delphic oracle Averell-Harriman, that he is impatient to carry the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) to a second treaty.

Although vague, none of this is yet cause for alarm. Although the high proportion of dovish intellectuals he has posted to Washington to prepare the transition in foreign and defense policies is disquieting.² Hopefully, the President-elect has left himself room for saving maneuver. The rest of us won't know whether he has the makings of a statesman until he begins to face up to the crucial questions linked to the reality of Soviet-bloc power and purpose—questions that the Presidential campaign ducked.

- Do Soviet-bloc aims and use of power imperil American security and, if so, what is the nature of the threat?
- If the danger is real, what should our defense posture be? Can we accept military inferiority? Shall we settle for parity or superiority?
- Are alliances essential? Are we prepared to demonstrate that the American leadership can be counted upon in crisis?
- If the danger is real and must be met with allies, what new direction and stimuli should be imparted to our strategic policies to restore our deterrence to aggression?

2. It is particularly disturbing that the migratory left-leaning, anti-defense technipols who flit in and out of the myriad Think Tanks and the White House, Pentagon and Congressional staffs are presumed to be calling the tune in the changing of the guard at the National Security Council and the CIA. Unfortunately, the able Mr. George Bush is leaving the CIA in January. In his brief term as Director, he and his deputy, E. Henry Knoche, have sought to bind up the wounds which the Agency had earlier suffered at the hands of the Church Committee. (For further details on the Church Committee, see the June 1976 *American Cause Special Report*: "On the Separation of Church and State.") Another assault could disable the Agency for a generation.

4
Sovereign communist states, by ideology, are Lenin's heirs. Whatever the dialectical differences, they remain united in the determination to isolate the United States to achieve world domination. Meanwhile, a score or more of freshly minted communist states and Marxist-leaning dictatorships in Africa and elsewhere have entered the Soviet-bloc orbit at fraternal rank. They give expression to this solidarity with increasing boldness and disdain for the United States in their sham deliberations of the UN which they manipulate for purposes of blackmail while our own observers watch helplessly.

There is no longer any question of the Soviet Union's ability to contest our presence in any part of the world beyond our shores. Our intelligence analysts now acknowledge that for some years they have been underestimating Soviet investment in military forces and war-supporting industries and research by as much as one-half. So the question of whether the world military balance has finally swung against us has become academic.

It is this unstated acceptance of likely U.S. inferiority, and at best parity, that differentiates NSC 68 from the position of the Committee on the Present Danger. "Surrender" as an alternative to risk in defense of national interests was abhorrent to the architects of the containment strategy. On the contrary, while they gave heed to the risk of a nuclear exchange, they measured that risk as an option that had to be faced. The notion that the Soviet nuclear weapons had rendered too dangerous a decisive head-to-head stand against Soviet aggression took root later among the gaggle of political and physical scientists who flocked to President Kennedy. General war, in their vocabulary, meant a harrowing choice between "surrender and a nuclear holocaust" with no middle ground.

Dr. Kissinger clothed this spurious and self-detering assumption in the garments of detente. "In an era of strategic balance, where both sides have the capacity to destroy-civilized-life," he has argued over and over again, "there is no alternative to detente." His dubious contribution to the strategy of deterrence has been the attempt to spin "a web of interests" calculated to draw the Russians into deals for grain and technology, and for limiting strategic arms and conventional forces in central Europe. His rationalization was that such enticements would awaken the Soviet leaders to the material advantages which would accrue to self-restraint and distract them from world conquest. So diverted, the Soviet ideologues would turn mellow and the West would thereby be spared the test of leadership for which Dr. Kissinger was persuaded it had lost will and stomach.

The historical meaning of containment is that in its too brief span it did contain. Made credible by the unequivocal preponderance of American military power assembled during the Eisenhower years, it confined Soviet

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The main levees did not begin to crumble until 1961. There was first Kennedy's unmistakable faltering of will at the Bay of Pigs and, then, a year and a half later, his reluctance to make good the showdown and exact a fair price in the missile crisis by forcing Castro's expulsion from Cuba for having conspired with the Kremlin to bring Soviet nuclear power into the Western Hemisphere.

After 1962, for lack of will, containment lost its spring. In Indochina, it snapped for good, despite a fearful frittering away of life and labor—again for lack of will—at the price of national unity. This year, in Angola, a total absence of will found the government unable to postulate and defend a position which was honorable and essential.

And now the ideological war—the class war turned into a war between races—has spread over sub-Saharan Africa. Moscow is arming black Marxist regimes and their guerrilla strike forces for the assault on Rhodesia, South West Africa and, eventually, South Africa itself. The Russians are no longer alone in Africa. Cuban troops and technicians together with East German technicians and black revolutionaries trained in the universities of the bloc, are besprinkled through Angola, Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Somalia. The Russians themselves, their gaze fixed on the main theater, are maneuvering for commanding geographical positions on the approaches to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

The dominoes will continue to fall and events will have their consequences. Soviet character remains unchanged and its ambitions unappeased.

The Clock Ticks On

The danger is clear and present.

Only by mustering superiority in all azimuths—military, economic, political, technological and, finally, in the spirit—can the United States hope to stop the spread of Soviet-bloc power.

The course we should take is clear enough. It is to return to the principles and strategy laid down by Truman and Acheson in NSC 68 and pursued by Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles in their time.

To try to make our lives easier in material terms, at the expense of national security, will only assure our ruin if, at the final margin, the Nation should be too weak in strength and spirit to meet and face down the threat.

Let us proceed therefore to reconfirm and strengthen our alliances with those people who are truly with us and who value their independence and freedom.

Superiority must logically be achieved with allies. The principal purpose of our armed forces should be the defense of allies. Without allies, war on us is much more certain. But to regain the trust of our allies, let alone re-

Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, the Nobel prize-winning writer and gallant emigre, has given eloquent warning of what is in store for Americans if we fail to identify the right answers. The Soviet Union, he believes, has already won the political side of its war for Europe, the Middle East and the emerging nations—what he calls the Third World War. In his view, the Kremlin strategists have been “breaking off as much of the West as they wanted—piece after piece, country after country. You can simply be taken with bare hands.”

That Solzhenitsyn's warning was heard among us at all on the eve of the Presidential campaign was due to the good offices of the AFL/CIO led by Mr. George Meany. In February, Mr. Meany invited the writer to speak in Washington, D.C. after Dr. Kissinger had advised President Ford to forego a meeting with him, rather than irritate the Russians. This shortsighted advice deprived the President of his one opportunity to hold discussions, face to face, with an informed and unique witness about the harsh realities of Soviet intentions.⁴

Dr. Malcolm Currie, Director of Research and Engineering for the Department of Defense, has warned those willing to listen. “By 1977,” he told the Congress in February, “the Soviets could, theoretically, initiate a counterforce strike against the United States, absorb (our) response, and then still have sufficient forces to attack Chinese and NATO nuclear capability, attack U.S. populations and military targets, and then still have a remaining throw-weight greater than ours. Beyond 1977, things will get worse.”

From Geneva, on November 26, the West German Willy Brandt, warned fellow Socialists that the urbane brand of “Eurocommunism” in France and Italy is as deadly as the Moscow and Peking brand. “One must

men and women, came together to sound a general alert. The prime movers on the Democratic side include former Secretary of State Dean Rusk and ex-Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze. Among the Republicans are former Deputy Defense Secretary David Packard; Clare Booth Luce, and Gordon Gray, members both of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and, significantly, Lane Kirkland, the brilliant General Secretary of the AFL/CIO. Their founding statement made these points:

- “Our country is in a period of danger, and the danger is increasing.”
- “The principal threat....is the Soviet drive for dominance based upon an unparalleled military buildup.”
- “The scope and sophistication of the Soviet campaign have been increased in recent years, and its tempo quickened. It encourages every divisive tendency within and among the developed states and between the developed and developing world. Simultaneously, the Soviet Union has been acquiring a network of positions including naval and air bases in the Southern Hemisphere which supports its drive for dominance in the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, Africa and the South Atlantic.”
- “Soviet expansion and the world-wide deployment of its military power threaten...the political independence of our friends and allies, their and our fair access to raw materials, the freedom of the seas...”
- “Without a stable balance of forces in the world, and policies of collective defense based upon it, no...objective of our foreign policy is attainable.”

What is the collective wisdom of these influential citizens?

“Soviet expansion and the world-wide deployment of its military power threaten...the political independence of our friends and allies, their and our fair access to raw materials, the freedom of the seas...”

understand the realities of communism in the late 20th Century,” he said. “Those who fight against phantoms lose sight of the real adversary.”

And finally, in Washington last month, the Committee on the Present Danger, made up of dozens of well-known

It is that if the drift continues, the United States could soon find itself “isolated in a hostile world,” and the inescapable outcome would then be a succession of “bitter choices between war and surrender.”

The Graver Choices

These views are very much a restatement made by NSC 68 a quarter of a century ago. One is reminded of another epigram: the more change, the more the same. So it is in the power equation.

4. This piece of hypocrisy perhaps tells us more about what is wrong with Dr. Kissinger's conduct of a foreign policy of detente. Only four decades ago, he and his family came to this country on the run from another despot. That he in his exalted position should have moved to “Gulliverize” this giant exile suggests a cynical disregard for our tradition of safe haven for others no less deserving of the opportunity to speak on the consequences of their actions.

That these questions went unasked through the contest for the Presidency attests to the wisdom of the epigram that those who ignore history are condemned to repeat it. The full text of the historic National Security Council paper known as NSC 68 has now come into the public domain. It reveals that President Truman was beset, 26 years ago, by much the same questions. Mr. Carter was then a junior officer in the Navy. When his turn as Commander-in-Chief comes and he has grasped the intelligence estimates, he may well perceive that the choices confronting him were foreshadowed by those pressing Mr. Truman as the West's attempt at coexistence with the Soviet Union came unravelled with the onset of the Cold War.³

For Truman, the forcing event was the Soviet Union's breaking of the American nuclear monopoly in August 1949. The Department of Defense was directed to collaborate with the State Department in recasting the Armed Forces nuclear doctrine in light of the changed circumstances and to weigh afresh the advisability of developing the more powerful thermonuclear weapon. Eight months later, in April 1950, Mr. Truman was given that and much more in the paper known as NSC 68, a tightly reasoned case for containing Soviet expansionism and a strategy for meeting it if a war was forced.

The counsel came none too soon. At that point, only five years after World War II, Stalin had swallowed Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania, and installed by stealth communist dictatorships in Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia. He had tried to wrest strategic positions in Turkey and Iran, armed the communists for their fierce civil wars in Greece and China, and blockaded Berlin. Now, within two months he would send the North Korean communists, armed by him in concert with the newly victorious Mao regime in Peking, against the thin line of United States and South Korean infantry before Seoul.

Secretary of State Dean Acheson was the senior author of NSC 68. He drew heavily on secret intelligence and the judgments of the scholar-diplomat George F. Kennan. The almost forgotten points of NSC 68 were:

As to the Soviet threat:

- The Soviet Union is animated by "a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, which seeks to impose

3. The first experience was the so-called "NEP" (New Economic Policy) period in the 1920s, when Lenin, desperate for technology and capital, opened Russia briefly to the avarice of the West. Among the eager entrepreneurs was a young American banker, Averell Harriman, as enthusiastic today for detente as he was then in pursuit of economic advantage in disregard of the national interest. The second was the war alliance, the good feeling which ended in 1948 with the Soviet blockade of Berlin and the end of the Marshall Plan.

- Its design for world hegemony "calls for the complete subversion or forcible destruction of the machinery of government and the structure of society" of non-communist nations, by means "both violent and non-violent," and by "infiltration and intimidation."
- If Soviet expansionism was not checked soon, no possible combination of the remaining free nations could assemble sufficient strength to stop it short of its goals."

As to the military response:

- The Soviet Union possessed armed forces "far in excess of those needed to defend the national territory."
- The United States must have an "overwhelming atomic capability," "command of the air" and sufficient conventional air, ground and sea forces so as not to be altogether dependent upon nuclear weapons.
- No moral restraints, only "calculations of practicality," would govern the Kremlin's decision whether to resort to a surprise attack, including the nuclear.

As to American leadership of free nations:

- A "cardinal" requirement in deterring war is to "possess sufficient strength in ourselves or in combination with like-minded nations."

As to a policy and strategy for facing down the threat:

- The Kremlin recognizes the United States as "the only threat" to the rapid achievement of its aims for world domination.
- The task of meeting the threat must start from an appreciation that "the cold war is indeed a real war in which the survival of the free world is at stake."
- "A large measure of sacrifice and discipline" had to be forthcoming from Americans and their allies for a "rapid and sustained" buildup of economic, political, and military strength in the United States and among our allies.
- "Without superior aggregate military strength, in being and really mobilizable, a policy of containment...is no more than a bluff."
- We stand in "greater danger of defeat from lack of will" than from any mistakes likely to flow from a show of purpose. "No nation ever saved its freedom by disarming itself in the hope of placating an enemy."

The Present Danger

These answers bespoke the resolution of an American leadership which, though but five years after a titanic battle with three totalitarian systems, nevertheless was prepared to stand up to a devouring Moscow-run communist imperialism.

What are the answers to the much harder questions of our day? Who is to speak out?

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cruit new ones, we must not demonstrate that we can stand firmly with them and not alone on issues strategic.

Mr. Carter has sensed the wisdom of this. At their November meeting he told President Ford of his intention to consult with our allies as an early order of business. A pity that Mr. Ford himself did not do that before he set out with Dr. Kissinger to do business, bilaterally, with Brezhnev at Vladivostok.

Credibility in leadership is nourished by mutual confidence, by performance, by how well the leader nation lives by its principles and obligations. A nation is judged

noon, word flashed through the town that the gunslinger, Frank Miller, who had terrorized the town until Marshal Kane brought him to justice, had been released from the penitentiary. He was coming back to Hadleyville to take revenge, and his old gang was at the railroad station, awaiting his arrival on the noon train. But when Marshal Kane broke in upon the services at the little church to ask for help, his plea fell on deaf ears. The banker, the merchant, the lawyer, the town clerk all drew back. Frank Miller, they argued, was the Marshal's responsibility; he was paid to handle it. So Kane, mindful of his duty, put


Credibility in leadership is nourished by mutual confidence, by performance, by how well the leader nation lives by its principles and obligations. A nation is judged by its moral behavior and stamina under pressure and in the discharge of its solemn commitments.

by its moral behavior and stamina under pressure and in the discharge of its solemn commitments.

So in a very real sense, our predicament resembles the classic situation in the enduring story of the movie *High Noon*. The prosperous citizens in the frontier town of Hadleyville are suddenly confronted with the return of a menace which they thought had been banished forever. The situation is classic because of its brilliant delineation of the opposed forces of good and evil. One Sunday fore-

aside everything he held dear—his bride, the honeymoon on which they were about to leave. He went out into the street alone and did the job.

We are not suggesting this simple situation offers a parallel to our national dilemma. Still, as with the issues posed before Truman in NSC 68, there's a moral waiting for a hero, a moral affected with high principles, and character devoid of self-interest. In a word, national survival. Will the man from Plains step forward and summon us to our duty?




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
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Suite 304
Washington, D.C. 20006



Personal

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By Hand : To



Alison Long Buck

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mand than the diamonds.

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RIGHT ON! The way we're checking up on politicians and watching every mouthful they eat to make sure it's paid for ethically. When we finally certify a politician as clean he will be ready not merely to be elected to office, but possibly to be canonized for sainthood.

R. GOMEZ JEWELRY
1707 ALAMO NATIONAL BLDG.
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS 78205

Executive Registry

76-4519

San Antonio, Texas
December 15, 1976

Mr. George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Bush:

Last night I heard your speech before the San Antonio Chamber of Commerce and thought it most informative. This morning I ran across the enclosed item in National Jeweler News magazine, and thought you would enjoy it because it is so appropo.

Best wishes

Raul A. Gomez
Raul A. Gomez

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